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I. INTRODUCTION  
A.  BACKGROUND   
Imagine fighting a war today without a careful plan, preparations, or concise 
instructions about how the various armed forces will achieve their objectives.  While 
imagining that, also consider the significant role that technology now plays in extending 
the boundaries of the battlefield.  A war without proper planning, coupled with an 
expansive battlefield, would have significant consequences, including an astronomical 
cost and an unacceptable loss of human lives.  Such a war would be nothing more than 
the execution of a number of separate tactical actions that may or may not lead ultimately 
to operational success.  It is that possibility that prompted military schools and 
institutions to initiate the instruction of officers in the art of planning and preparation for 
war.  They began teaching what is now known as the Operational Art of Warfare 
(OPART). 
The Operational Art of Warfare emerged in curriculums in which officers studied 
past conflicts and analyzed both the factors that contributed to victory and the factors that 
contributed to defeat.  As a result, military thinking about the operational level of war 
expanded and military doctrine became increasingly sophisticated and attentive to the 
strategy and tactics of warfare.  Military historians trace these developments to World 
War I, which changed the way countries viewed the art of warfare.  Armies operating in 
different theaters required strategic objectives and plans that were applicable to their own 
strategic environment.  The various dynamics that caused military strategists to rethink 
how warfare would be conducted included, especially, the advent and application of 
technology which expanded the battlefield; and the realization that armies were 
progressively getting larger.  The implication was that a single battle may not be decisive, 
and, therefore, tactics could not solely guarantee the accomplishment of the strategic 
objectives.  The end result was the creation of an operational art that linked tactics and 
strategy. 
This research will focus on one component of the operational art of warfare, the 
concept of a center of gravity (COG) as defined by Carl von Clausewitz, which is critical 
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to the way militaries devise strategies to defeat an enemy.  It is important to note that this 
concept was created specifically to give military strategists tools to defeat opposing 
militaries; and it is very successful when used in that context.  The reason for this is that, 
when opposing militaries engage in combat, they generally conduct conventional warfare, 
which gives them some insight into the types of tactics that may be used.  Formally 
organized militaries are also usually centralized and are typically institutions of the state. 
Thus, they provide a strategic target for opposing militaries.  But how does COG apply to 
conflict when a state military’s opponent is not a state-instituted organization?  
B. DEFINITION OF THE MILITARY CONCEPT “CENTER OF GRAVITY”  
Modern warfare has evolved to the use of asymmetric tactics by non-state actors 
to influence the political environment.  As these tactics gain popularity it is increasingly 
important for states to reevaluate the proper strategy necessary to respond, and 
subsequently defeat, these tactics in an efficient manner.  A key component to examining 
the current form of warfare and its subsequent defeat is the concept of center of gravity.  
The concept of COG has been a determining factor in wars for nearly two centuries. It 
was first introduced by Carl Von Clausewitz in his book, On War, and today is still a 
critical issue with regards to planning and executing war strategies.  According to 
Clausewitz, 
one must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. 
Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of 
power and movement, on which everything depends. This is the point 
against which all our energies should be directed.1  
The only way that a military can achieve its objectives, according to Clausewitz, 
is to gather intelligence about the enemy’s “moral and physical character,” including their 
associated COG.2  If the military strategist fails to do so, defeat is almost certain. 
In their effort to better achieve success on the battlefield, military strategists have 
incorporated the concept of COG into several joint publications (JP): JP 3-07, Joint 
Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War; JP 1, Warfare of the Armed Forces of 
                                                 
1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans., Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976, 595. 
2 Joseph Strange and Richard Iron, “Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities,” Quantico, Virginia: 
The Marine Corps Association: 1996, 1-12. 
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the United States; and JP 5-0, Doctrine for Joint Planning Operations.  All refer to a 
wealth of literature that discusses the concept of COG.  All claim that a determination of 
the enemy’s Centers of Gravity, and sometimes our own, is critical for planning and 
executing successful military operations.3  JP 5-0 states specifically that “the most 
important task confronting campaign planners in this process is being able to identify 
friendly and adversary strategic centers of gravity.”4 
In an article entitled, “Center of Gravity Analysis” Colonel Eikmeier states that 
“the center of gravity is too important a concept to guess at.”5  The widespread emphasis 
on the concept of COG shows clearly that it is relevant when dealing with military-to-
military engagements.  It is not so clear-cut, however, when the engagement involves an 
opponent that is not a state military and that uses asymmetric tactics. 
Prior to identifying Centers of Gravity in warfare, it is necessary to identify the 
nature of the conflict.  This is important because participants in a specific conflict have 
their own unique reasons for fighting, and thus the hub, or critical component, that the 
opposing military power should target will differ from conflict to conflict.  According to 
Clausewitz, the first and most important strategic question that must be answered is, 
“What is the nature of the conflict?”6  This research will focus solely on non-state actors’ 
use of asymmetric tactics and the conventional militaries that have confronted those 
tactics.  
To properly determine the nature of a conflict involving non-state actors, we must 
first review the military’s existing definition of “terrorism”, the tactic most often used in 
non-conventional warfare. According to JP 1-02, terrorism is: 
                                                 
3 Margaret E. Schalch, “Planning for Peace Operations: The Relevancy of Center of Gravity” (Report) 
Marine Corps University and Command Staff College, 1997 (accessed February 17, 2005). 
4 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning,” JP 5-00.1, Washington, D.C. 
January 25, 2002. 
5 Dale C. Eikmeier, “COG Analysis,” Military Review, July-August 2004, (accessed February 17, 
2006). 
6 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans., Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976, 88–89. 
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the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; 
intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit 
of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.7 
A close examination of the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center, shows why 
reviewing the nature of a conflict is important and why it is difficult to use the COG 
concept as military planners currently do.  The attacks on 9/11 were clearly an act of 
terror, but no terrorist organization came forward immediately to claim responsibility and 
no demands were made.8   
This presented a problem for the United States because the attackers were 
apparently not sanctioned by a recognized nation-state.  Once the culprits were identified 
as members of a known terrorist group, al Qaeda, however, the United States decided to 
attack a nation-state, Afghanistan, because it was there that al Qaeda had training camps 
and was deemed a state sanctuary for al Qaeda terrorists.  Thus, the military went in and 
dominated the area and captured or killed many of the leaders of al Qaeda.  They also 
removed the current ruling party, the Taliban, from power but this did not stop al Qaeda’s 
terrorist activities.  
Examining the 9/11 attacks raises the question, “Does the concept of COG apply 
to the current asymmetric use of terror and other means of non-conventional warfare?”  
This research will explore that question by looking at previous conflicts that involved 
non-state actors using terror and other non-conventional tactics against formidable 
militaries that were trying to combat those tactics. 
C. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS  
Chapter II focuses on the 1954 war in Algeria, in which the Muslim Algerians 
fought for their independence from the French Fourth Republic-the government in France 
under the fourth republican constitution.  In its colonization of Algeria, France treated the 
Algerians like second-class citizens.  The colonialists rigged elections in an effort to limit 
the indigenous population’s participation in the political arena and instituted reforms that 
                                                 
7 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” 
Joint Pub 1-02, Washington, D.C., April 12, 2002 (Amended 30 November 2004) (accessed February 20, 
2005). 
8 The National War College Student Task Force on Combating Terrorism, “Combating Terrorism in a 
Globalized World,” (Report) National War College, May 2002, 9-10. 
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increasingly disenfranchised and marginalized them.  As a result, groups of prominent 
Muslims organized and united their efforts to overthrow the French minority. One group, 
the National Liberation Front (FLN), became prominent but was not equipped with the 
resources required to launch a full-scale war against the French.  Therefore, they were 
forced to derive tactics that were favorable in terms of the resources at hand.   
The main tactic they used against the French colonialists was a “calculated use of 
violence,” or terrorism, the common historical tactic of oppressed peoples.  The FLN 
combined those terrorist tactics with sophisticated propaganda in an attempt to influence 
the French political system into offering them independence.  What is significant is that, 
even though the Fourth Republic had all the military resources necessary to defeat the 
FLN in a decisive manner, it never did.  The problem the Fourth Republic faced was the 
decentralized nature of the numerous Muslim groups while the groups were supporting 
the same cause; they acted independently of one another.  Primarily, the French army 
concentrated on disrupting the FLN by capturing and killing its leaders—a method that is 
consistent with the COG concept—but that tactic had very little success.  New leaders 
quickly replaced the fallen ones. 
Chapter III focuses on the Palestinian–Israeli conflict.  Throughout history, the 
Palestinians have never enjoyed the autonomy and sovereignty of a state.  In the early 
1900s the Palestinians were subjects of the Ottoman Empire; from 1920 to 1948 they 
lived under British rule.  Soon after that, the newly established state of Israel occupied 
the majority of what had, until then, been known as Palestine.  Subsequently, the 
Palestinians had no formal state identity and were suppressed and deprived of political 
participation.  That status quo would eventually be challenged, however, with the 
outbreak of the First Intifada. 
The word “intifada,” literally, means “to shake off” or “wake from sleep,” which 
is exactly what happened when the Palestinian uprising began in 1987.  At the beginning 
of the First Intifada there was very little violence, other than rock throwing and the 
occasional bottle bomb, perpetrated by the Palestinians.  Toward the end of the Intifada, 
terror activities became more prevalent.  It seems almost incomprehensible that the 
powerful Israeli military could not put an end to the Palestinian revolt, considering the 
6 
resources that were at its disposal and its indiscriminant use of those resources.  Instead, 
the Israeli forces experienced tremendous difficulties as the level of violence increased. 
The First Intifada ended with the Oslo Agreements, which were intended to lift the 
oppression of the Palestinians, but, due to their ineffectiveness, instead led to a second 
Intifada.  The Second Intifada, which is still going on today, has to some extent been the 
complete opposite of the first, in that the primary tactic used by the Palestinians is no 
longer merely rock throwing, but terror.  The question the chapter explores therefore is, 
Why has Israel’s superior military not been able to defeat the Palestinians and end the 
violence?  
Chapter IV focuses on U.S. involvement in the Middle East.  The United States 
became increasingly involved in the Middle East because of its policy to contain the 
spread of communism and its need for, and now dependence on, oil. After the Shah was 
overthrown in Iran and the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the United States began 
deploying more and more troops in the region.  The presence of the American military in 
the region outraged many Muslims, as they interpreted the Koranic scripture as 
forbidding the presence of nonbelievers near the site of the Two Holy Mosques, Saudi 
Arabia.  In the backlash against the American military presence and the governments in 
the region that supported the United States, radical Islamic fundamentalists launched 
terrorist attacks on both Americans and supportive local governments.  The events that 
took place during 1979 and afterward led to the formulation of al Qaeda, the cause of and 
central terrorist target in, the current Global War on Terror. 
Chapter V concludes and summarizes the thesis’s findings.  It also points out the 
future challenges that the U.S. military, and others that attempt to implement the strategic 
concept of Centers of Gravity, may face if the concept is not altered to gain better 
applicability in the current asymmetric combat environment.  Finally, recommendations 
concerning the definition and application of the COG concept are also provided. 
D. PRIMARY THESIS ARGUMENT 
The military concept of a Center of Gravity, as introduced by Carl von 
Clausewitz, is one of today’s most popular concepts for planning strategies to conduct 
war.  Historically, conventional militaries have enjoyed tremendous success when 
applying this concept with force to subdue other conventional militaries.  Conventional 
7 
militaries have not been so successful, however, in applying COG concepts against 
enemies that are not state-sanctioned and that use asymmetric tactics.  This research seeks 
to determine whether the current application of COG as defined by Clausewitz is 
applicable in the current asymmetric warfare environment.  The finding of this thesis is 
that the current military thinking with regard to, and its application of, a COG are not 
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II. THE FRENCH FOURTH REPUBLIC VERSUS THE 
ALGERIAN NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The war fought by the French against the Algerian National Liberation Front  
(French Front de Libération Nationale), or FLN, in the 1950s and early 1960s is an 
example of how a small, militarily inferior group such as the FLN can achieve its 
objectives by using terror tactics against a formidable opponent, in this case, the French 
army.  The acts of terror committed by the FLN were not designed to defeat the French 
army, but rather, to divide the French colonialists, the Pied-noirs (named for their black 
shoes) and the Muslim communities.  This strategy by the significantly outnumbered and 
out-gunned FLN was successful in that their acts of terror caused the French army to 
react in a way that undermined French and International support.  Without public support, 
the French army was defeated, albeit indirectly. 
It was that international audience that eventually, after eight years of savage war, 
led to the fall of the Fourth Republic and independence for Algeria.  The FLN convinced 
the French citizenry that the professional and well-equipped French army could not 
quickly or efficiently defeat the FLN. Despite its lesser numbers and weapons, the FLN’s 
use of asymmetric tactics and propaganda frustrated the French military’s objective to 
defeat the FLN by targeting its leadership, which the French considered to be the FLN’s 
key source of power, that is, its Center of Gravity.  
This chapter will focus on the protracted conflict between the Fourth Republic 
and the FLN.  The chapter begins with an examination of the formation of the FLN, 
which shows the Algerian Muslims’ main source of contention and the make up of the 
FLN leadership, which the French army would later perceive as the FLN’s COG.  Then, 
the terror acts committed in the months before the Battle of Algiers will be highlighted.  
The Battle of Algiers is the focal point because it was the most violent and arguably the 
most significant battle of the conflict.  The chapter also discusses the French military 




explanation of the results of the battle and a summary of the findings.  This methodology 
illustrates the degree of difficulty that states encounter when they implement the concept 
of COG in their strategies to defeat non-state forces. 
B. FORMATION OF THE ALGERIAN NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT 
For Algerian Muslims, the question of their national identity was of critical 
importance.  After World War II, they found themselves marginalized and 
disenfranchised in many respects.  After the French ruthlessly crushed the Setif revolt in 
1945 and the division and cancellation of various Algerian nationalistic groups, the Pied-
noirs were briefly enjoyed unchallenged power.  The French government, however, was 
rattled by the events that occurred at Setif, and drew up a new Algerian Bill of Rights in 
1947.  The statute addressed five reforms that had been demanded by the Muslims for a 
number of years: 
1) the suppression of the communes (mixtes), and their replacement by 
democratically elected local councils; 2) the suppression of the military 
government of the Saharan territories, and their replacement by civil 
departments; 3) the recognition of Arabic as an official language alongside 
French; 4) the separation of Church and State for the Muslims, as for the 
other religions; and 5) the enfranchisement of Muslim women.9  
The statute was a positive step, but it was also inequitable in regard to population 
balancing. 
The statute did not address the unfair double-college principle, which determined 
the formulation of two electoral colleges: one made up of the small number of French 
citizens in Algeria plus the upper-class Muslims; the other made up of the vast amount of 
average Muslims who were eligible to vote.  The French government’s failure to address 
this principle further exacerbated the problem of national identity in Algeria.  The 
following dramatic dialogue captures the essence of the opposing views:  
M. Boukadoum: “Don’t forget that I’m an Algerian, first and foremost!”   
M. Louvel: “That’s an admission!”  
(From several benches, in the center): “You are French, first and 
foremost!”   
                                                 
9 Allistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace, MacMillam London Limited: London, 1977, 69. 
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M. Boukadoum: “I am a Muslim Algerian, first and foremost!”   
M. Musmeaux: “If you consider the Muslim Algerians as French, give 
them the rights of the French!” 
M. Louvel:  “Then let them declare that they’re French.”10 
Thus, in this respect, the statute satisfied only a small part of the populace; in fact, 
Algerian deputies—especially Messali’s Movement for the Triumph of Democratic 
Liberties (M.T.L.D.) and the Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto (U.D.M.A.)—
refused to recognize the French Assembly’s ability to legislate the statute. 
The elections that followed were rigged, and the M.T.L.D. and U.D.M.A. 
received disproportionate seats in the Assembly.  The leaders of the nationalistic 
movement in Algeria were outraged, and the rift between the Pied-noir and the Muslims 
continued to grow.  The Pied-noir, aware of the frustration, tried to “fix” the problem by 
disrupting the movement leaders. Messali Hadj, leader of the M.T.L.D., for example, was 
deported to the French Congo, and Ferhat Abbas was placed under house arrest.  At that 
point, the original leaders of the movement began slipping into the shadows, and the 
World War II war heroes returning to Algeria began to lead the charge. 
One such hero, who played a significant role in the quest for Independence, was 
Ahmed Ben Bella.  Twice, he signed up with the French army and during the 1940 
campaign he was recognized and awarded for his meritorious service.  Reassigned after 
the fall of France, he joined a Moroccan regiment to fight in the Italian campaign.  It was 
there that Ben Bella formed an admiration for the Italian resistance.  But when he 
returned to Algeria, disgusted with the events that had taken place in Setif, he declined 
the commission he was offered and instead entered local politics.  He became a 
successful municipal councilor, an office that he later had to abandon because of an 
altercation in which he shot and wounded an adversary.   
As a result Ben Bella changed his name and went underground with the M.T.L.D. 
Later he was one of the founders of a group called the Organisation Speciale (O.S.),11 
                                                 
10 Allistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace, MacMillam London Limited: London, 1977, 70. 
11 George A. Kelly, Lost Soldiers, The French Army and Empire in Crisis, 1947-1962, The M.I.T. 
Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1965, 157. 
12 
which pledged to use all means to fight against colonialism. According to the historian 
Alistair Horne, “the O.S. was in effect the first nationalist body dedicated to preparing for 
an armed conflict with France—now considered inevitable—and thereby it became the 
immediate predecessor of the FLN.”12  By 1949, Ben Bella was recognized as the most 
vigorous leader of the Operation Speciale, which had grown to about 4,500 members.  It 
was subsequently disbanded by the French police as a result of the group’s poor security 
and good French intelligence.  Ben Bella was sentenced to eight years imprisonment; the 
other leaders escaped and either dispersed abroad or joined other anti-French groups in 
the country.  Of the original founders, Ahmed Ben Bella, Ali Mahsas, and Mostefa Ben 
Boulaid were captured, but escaped; Belkacem Krim, Omar Ouamrane, Lakhdar Ben 
Tobbal, and Mohamed Boudiaf went underground in Algeria; and Mohamed Khider and 
Hocine Ait Ahmed found refuge in Cairo.13  They are significant because most of them 
were founders of the FLN and considered the terrorists’ power center, that is, the Center 
of Gravity that fueled the terrorists. 
In 1951, due primarily to the electoral fraud that took place that year, the 
U.D.M.A. and the M.T.L.D., joined by the Algerian Communist Party, formed the 
Common Front for the Defense and Respect for Liberty.14  This front did nothing more 
than give lip service to the struggle, however, which caused a split in the M.T.L.D., 
whose  two groups, in 1954, began killing each other.  The leaders of the Pied-noir 
merely watched the disarray of the Muslim nationalist organizations in delight  The 
leaders of the O.S. who had been dispersed knew that the division among the ranks would 
delay the revolt, and in March of 1954, Ben Bella and his fellow escapees called a 
meeting in Paris.  There they agreed on the need for a third force, and by the end of April 
formed C.R.U.A., the Comite Revolutionnaire d’Unite et d’Action.  The founders were 
Hocine Ait Ahmed, Ahmed Ben Bella, Mostefa Ben Bouliad, Larbi Ben M’hidi, Rabah 
Bitat, Mohamed Boudiaf, Mourad Didouche, Mohamed Khider, and Belkacem Krim—all 
of whom were dedicated to the inevitability of an armed revolt and acknowledged that the 
use of extreme violence would be paramount.  
                                                 




By mere coincident, the first meeting of the Comite Revolutionnaire occurred on 
the day the French were defeated at Dien Bien Phu.  The atmosphere changed and 
became extremely optimistic because the French army was now thought to be in a 
position of vulnerability. As rumors of the defeat spread throughout Algeria, it had a 
positive effect on the C.R.U.A. recruitment.  In July 1954, at a meeting of the Committee 
of Twenty-Two, which comprised the C.R.U.A. and other operatives throughout Algiers, 
the members voted unanimously to expedite the revolt.15  And they also decided that 
once the armed revolt began, it would be an “unlimited revolution” that would not end 
until full independence was gained by Algeria. 
The order was given to all operatives to prepare to fight.  Ben Bella, Mahsas, and 
Boudiaf sought support for arms and propaganda from the Nasser regime.  In October, 
the C.R.U.A. was renamed the Front de Liberation Nationale (in English, the National 
Liberation Front), or FLN.  And on November 1, 1954, the Catholic feastday, All Saints 
Day, what has been called one of the bloodiest wars for independence officially began.  
C. THE MONTHS LEADING UP TO THE BATTLE OF ALGIERS 
In June of 1956, Governor-General Lacoste ordered two members of the FLN 
who were imprisoned in the Barberousse prison to be executed.  The order came as a 
result of pressure from the Pied-noir and the general’s need to institutionalize an intended 
bill of rights. FLN members were furious about the inhumane conditions in the prison 
and even more infuriated by the news of the executions.  As for the prison conditions, 
Bitat, the leader of the Algiers network who was imprisoned there, wrote: “It is hell, men 
are beaten with iron bars, the heat is horrible, and they are given salted water to drink.”16  
Saadi Yacef, who was the temporary leader of the Algiers network while Bitat 
was in prison, was ordered to kill any European between the ages of 18 to 44, excluding 
women. During the period June 21–24, Yacef’s squads killed forty-nine civilians.17 
These events marked the beginning of random terrorism in Algiers committed by the 
FLN.  The Pied-noir’s counterterrorist group retaliated by blowing up a house in Casbah, 
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which was a suspected bomb-making site used by Yacef.  The explosion also destroyed 
three nearby houses, killing seventy Muslims, including women and children.18  The FLN 
denied the charge that they had directed bombs against people and vowed to avenge the 
deaths of the Muslims in the explosion.  Albane ordered Ben M’hidi, the appointed leader 
of the Algiers Autonomous Zone- Z.A.A,19, and his executive officer, Yacef, to prepare 
for a major offensive.   
Yacef began recruiting operatives, and by late 1956, he had organized 
approximately 1,400, among whom were a number of young attractive Muslim women.  
They would later be used to carry out bombings in places where the men could not gain 
access. Some of the women were not completely comfortable, however, with the grim 
fate that the Europeans would suffer as a result of the bombs they would strategically 
place.  But Yacef constantly reminded them of the execution of the FLN members in June 
and the deaths of the seventy Muslims killed by the Pied-noir counterterrorist groups.  
That gave them the motivation needed to carry out the first wave of bombings. 
1. The First Bombings by the FLN 
The first bombings were to take place in the center of European Algiers.  The 
young women who carried out the attack were able to do so because they could infiltrate 
the area without being subjected to a bodily search.  In preparation, the women removed 
their veils and dressed like Pied-noir women would typically dress.  The plan was for 
three bombs to go off at one-minute intervals.  The first bomb location, a Milk Bar, was 
chosen because, on a Sunday evening, the place would usually be filled with Pied-noirs, 
including women and children, on their way home from the beach.  The second bomb 
was placed in a cafeteria on the smart Rue Michelet, a popular gathering place for Pied-
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Of the first two bombs, the explosion in the Milk Bar had the greatest effect, 
because the walls there were covered with glass which, once broken, created quantities of 
glass splinters that proved to be lethal.  The bombs killed three people and wounded fifty, 
including amputating about a dozen limbs, included those of a number of children.  The 
Pied-noir, as expected, reacted with violence. 
Yacef’s organization continued to terrorize the population in Algiers.  This was 
considered a good FLN strategy, because the horrific violence in the A.A.Z. zone created 
a huge rift in the European and Muslim communities.  Schools were closed throughout 
October, and the Europeans began to carry weapons in fear they would be attacked by 
Muslims as they approached them on the streets.  To further exacerbate the situation, 
M’hidi and Yacef began to assassinate influential Pied-noir leaders.  At this point, the 
FLN’s goal was to both increase awareness of what was happening in Algiers and 
provoke the French into overreacting to the atrocities that were being carried out. 
2. The Assassination of Mayor Froger 
The first assassination victim was the mayor, Amedee Froger, who was chosen 
because of his status as a powerful and influential leader of the Pied-noir colonialists.20 
Yacef chose Ali la Pointe to carry out the mission.  Pointe had served a two-year sentence 
in Barberousse prison, where FLN prisoners persuaded him to join the cause, pointing out 
that he, too, was a victim of colonialism.  He later became one of Yacef’s most faithful 
followers. 
On the morning of December 28, 1956, Ali la Pointe shot Mayor Froger three 
times at point-blank range, killing him.  The Pied-noir turned out in great numbers for the 
funeral of their slain leader, an occasion which Yacef viewed as an opportunity to plant 
another bomb.  The bomb exploded in the cemetery, but had little desired effect because 
of its late placement. Nonetheless, the crowd was outraged.  The funeral members began 
dragging innocent Muslims from their cars and lynching them, and veiled Muslim 
women were bashed in the head by young Pied-noir thugs with iron bars.  The mayhem  
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continued throughout the remainder of the day, causing the death of four Muslims and 
injuring another fifty.  The situation in Algiers exceeded the police’s ability to control it, 
causing Governor-General Lacoste to request military assistance. 
D. THE FRENCH MILITARY RESPONSE 
Lacoste summoned General Massu to aid the fifteen hundred police in Algiers 
with forty-six hundred members of the 10th Para Division.21  For the first time in the two 
years of war, the French military accepted the challenge presented by the FLN and was 
willing to use the force necessary to deal with it successfully.  Their acceptance of the 
challenge played into the strategy used by the FLN.  General Massu was responsible for 
maintaining order in Algiers, which meant opposing both the terror tactics used by the 
FLN and the backlash that those tactics created.22 
Massu was selected to restore order because he had a great deal of pride in his job 
and was a stern disciplinarian.  He had also had some experience in maintaining civil 
order when he carried out a pacification mission in the mid-Sahara.  And during the Suez 
conflict in 1956, he had displayed great determination by declaring that he was prepared 
to accept thirty to forty percent casualties to get the job done.  It was the same type of 
persona that was to create big problems in the Battle of Algiers. 
1. Massu’s First Clash with the FLN 
The FLN planned a general strike that was to start on January 28, 1957.  The 
strike, which was planned to coincide with a United Nation session in New York, was 
intended as another strategic move to gain international publicity for the Muslim 
Algerians’ fight for independence.  It was to last eight days, a time span that, in the event, 
proved detrimental to their effort because of the response of the French army.  The FLN 
leadership handed down one specific instruction: strikers were to demonstrate in the most 
decisive manner the total support of the entire Algerian people for the FLN, its unique 
representative.  The object of the demonstration, they said, was to bestow an 
incontestable authority upon the Muslim Algerian delegates at the United Nations in 
order to convince those rare diplomats who were still hesitant or had illusions about 
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France’s liberal policy.23  The FLN knew that it would take more than just the killing of 
colonialists to gain international attention.  The leaders thought that the terror that 
Yacef’s organization had wrought on the communities in Algiers, coupled with the 
FLN’s influence on the trade unions, would be enough to sustain the strike over an eight-
day period and therefore achieve their goal of exposure. 
But the strike plans proved to be a major tactical error, because General Massu 
had been issued orders to disrupt the strike by any and all means necessary.  The day the 
strike began, Massu ordered his troops to rip the steel shutters off the shops, which left 
the goods in them exposed and unsecured.  A pillage of the goods ensued, which forced 
the shop owners to rush in to secure and protect their merchandize.24  Once the owners 
arrived, Massu had his troops threaten to arrest them if they did not remain there and 
conduct business as usual.  He also ordered trucks to go around and collect the strikers 
and physically make them go to work.  The following day, Massu’s men continued 
picking up shop owners, and they also began picking up young Muslims who were not at 
school.  The strike was broken in less than forty-eight hours. 
2. The Second Wave of Bombings by Yacef 
Yacef planned a wave of bombings that were carried out two days prior to the 
planned strike.  Women were to plant three bombs in the center of European Algiers on a 
Saturday afternoon.  One bomb was placed in the Otomatic, a popular student bar; the 
others were placed in the cafeteria and Coq-Hardi, a popular brasserie.  The bomb in the 
Coq-Hardi produced the deadliest effect because it exploded under a cast-iron table, 
causing the iron fragments to pierce and slice through the flesh of the people nearby.  The 
death toll was five, with sixty wounded.  Approximately two weeks later, on a Sunday, 
other bombs exploded in two crowded stadiums.  They were also placed by girls, because 
Yacef’s male operatives were often searched and denied access to those types of places.  
3. The Net Closes 
After a witness of the Coq-Hardi bombing told the police that a woman had sat at 
the table prior to the explosion, all women leaving the Casbah were searched.  The 
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French then began to concentrate their efforts on finding and destroying Yacef’s network.  
To the French, the leadership in Yacef’s network was the Mulsim Algerians’ center of 
gravity.  The police launched raids and interrogations of operatives soon led to the near 
destruction of the network.  After the arrest and interrogation of bombers resulted in the 
capture and death of Ali Boumendjel, a young FLN lawyer and a highly significant figure 
within the leadership, Albane urged the leaders in the area to leave Algiers.  When 
M’hidi realized that the recent events were all the product of the strike, and he began to 
think that the FLN would soon lose the entire battle. 
A network of French informers ultimately led the Paras to Ben M’hidi on 
February 25, 1957.  Less than ten days later Lacoste’s press officer released a statement 
saying that M’hidi had hanged himself in his cell, but the complete story and the truth 
about M’hidi’s death remains a mystery.  From a spy on the Algiers police force, the FLN 
received a report that M’hidi had been killed by paratroops after being tortured.  
Whatever the truth of the matter, M’hidi’s death drew the public’s attention to the French 
army’s torture and execution of rebel suspects.  French citizens in France then began to 
refer to the police and army handling of the rebels and the rebellion as la torture.  In 
French public opinion, for the next five years of the war, the issue of torture was the main 
source of controversy.  Torture had been abolished in France in 1789, having been 
documented by French humanists prior to 1789 as inhumane and inefficient. The French 
people, for the most part, felt that torture was both morally and philosophically wrong, so 
learning that such tactics were widely used by the French army angered many.  In 
response, General Massu claimed that the atrocious acts being carried out by the FLN 
warranted those extreme measures.  He said that the only way to carry out his assigned 
mission was to gain intelligence information about the FLN by any and all means 
necessary. And, in this, he seemed to have the support of Governor-General Lacoste, as 
rumors of the torture tactics, as well as the actual methods of the torture, were made 
known to him and he did little to stop it.  Lacoste’s failure to act played a key role in the 
destruction of the Fourth Republic and the achievement of Algeria’s Independence. 
4. Alleg Speaks Out 
Henri Alleg, the Communist editor for the Alger Republican, a European Jew who 
had settled in Algeria during World War II, was arrested and interrogated by the French 
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army. In his book The Question, he gives a detailed account of the torture he was 
subjected to during the interrogation process, including how electrodes were placed on 
his ears and fingers and his recall of how “a flash of lightening exploded next to my ear 
and I felt my heart racing in my breast.”25  He also discusses the various forms of water 
torture that were used: thrusting a suspects’ heads into water buckets until they were half-
drowned; a hose shoved into their mouths, filling their lungs and stomachs with cold 
water, while their nose was stopped up, so they couldn’t breathe.  Alleg also mentions the 
torture of hearing the moans of the suffering of those tortured nearby.  His detailed and 
moving account caused an uproar in France. 
5. Pierre Leulliette Speaks Out 
Pierre Liulliette, a paratrooper in the French army, echoed Alleg’s account of the 
French army’s torture practices.  He also spoke about how the paras were, in some cases, 
reluctant to perform torture, but later became accustomed to it.  Liulliette talked about 
how very few paras seemed to realize or even care that some of the suspects being 
tortured were innocent and how deeply depressed he was by what was happening around 
him.  He recalled how all day long he could hear the cries through the floor boards, cries 
not unlike the cries of animals being slowly put to death.  Liulliette revealed that some of 
the people who had “disappeared” had actually died as a result of torture and been buried.  
Again, the French populace was appalled by the atrocities being carried out by their 
fellow Frenchmen. 
6. L’Affaire Audin Disappears 
L’Affaire Audin, a member of the same Communist cell as Henri Alleg, was 
arrested for allegedly providing a safe haven for “terrorists.”  The official military report 
states that Audin tried to escape in the night and shots were fired, however, his body was 
never found.  Other reports suggest that he was murdered and secretly buried.  And 
because of all the previous stories of torture, the French public had lost confidence in 
reports from the military. 
7. Bollardiere and Teitgen Protest 
General Jacques de Bollardiere, the Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour, who 
had a very distinguished military career, became involved in the Battle of Algiers because 
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of the proximity of his command sector to Algiers.  He was outraged by Muslim 
women’s stories of how their sons and husbands disappeared in the night.  Bollardiere 
interviewed General Massu and informed him of his opposition to what was going on 
under his command. Finally, totally disgusted with what was happening in Algiers, 
General Bollardiere wrote the commander in chief and requested to be transferred back to 
France.  In a letter to a friend, later published in the L’Express, he described how the 
French army in Algiers was committing immoral acts.  His punishment was a sentence of 
sixty days of fortress arrest. 
Shortly thereafter, Paul Teitgen, the French Secretary-General at the Perfecture, 
sent Governor-General Lacoste his resignation.26  Pressured by the chief of police to have 
a suspect tortured in an effort to discover where a bomb was scheduled to go off, he 
refused. 
But I refused to have him tortured. I trembled the whole afternoon.  
Finally the bomb did not go off. Thank God I was right. Because if you 
once get into the torture business, you’re lost. . . . Understand this, fear 
was the basis of it all. All our so-called civilization is covered with a 
varnish. Scratch it, and underneath you find fear. The French, even the 
Germans, are not torturers by nature. But when you see the throats of your 
copains slit, then the varnish disappears.”27   
Teitgen, who had been tortured at Dachau, refused to torture himself, something he was 
adamantly against.  The protest by these two prominent figures only increased the 
anguish the French people felt regarding the French army. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Seen from a strictly military perspective, it was General Massu who won the 
Battle of Algiers.  The tactics used to win the military conflict, however, when they 
became known, undermined French support.  The French army’s use of torture had a 
profound impact on French public opinion.  The Algerian National Liberation Front, on 
the other hand, was very effective: it gained international attention by its use of terror 
tactics to provoke a similar response by the French army.  The deaths of prominent FLN 
figures such as M’hidi, Boumendjel, and Audin, along with the detailed stories of torture, 
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described by Alleg and others were instrumental in exposing those practices.  These 
events raised the awareness of people hundreds of miles away who had no first-hand 
knowlege of what was happening in Algeria.  As Dr. Douglas Porch points out in “The 
Inversion of the Levee en Masse,” a chapter in the book The People In Arms, “Even 
though the levee en masse failed to legitimize the revolutionary movement among the 
people, such was the power of the levee in the public mind that it invariably helped to 
legitimize the revolutionary movement beyond the theater of conflict.”28  The French 
army had won the battle but lost the war. 
Typically, states engage in war with states, and there are clear strategic objectives 
to be achieved by the destruction or significant damage of the enemy’s military forces or 
the opposing state’s infrastructure.  But when a state engages in a war against an 
opponent that does not adhere to conventional warfare behavior or is not vulnerable to the 
same consequences, politically and internationally, for its actions, the state will encounter 
great difficulties in determining the appropriate strategies to use to be victorious.  This 
occurs because of the comparitive disproportion between the military force and the force 
of the non-state actor.  In Algeria, for example, when confronted by the widespread 
terrorist tactics employed by the FLN, the Fourth Republic resorted to torture tactics to 
obtain intelligence that would lead them to the leadership of the FLN, which they would 
then destroy.  
The army’s critical mistake was its use of military force to counter the 
asymmetric tactics of the non-state actors, the FLN. Clausevitz’s idea of a center of 
gravity in conflicts includes the capture or death of the enemy leadership if it is believed 
that their capture or death will lead to a decisive defeat of the enemy.  That was not the 
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III. ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN INTIFADAS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
For centuries, conflicts involving nation-states usually end when one side is the 
victor and the other sues for peace.  The question we are exploring here is, “What 
happens when a formidable state’s military engages in a conflict with non-state aligned 
irregular forces?”  For the purposes of this research, we focus on two such 
unconventional forces: terrorists and members of an occupied country or territory who 
mobilize to overthrow their occupiers.  The two types of forces are not mutually 
exclusive: under occupation, people may, and often do, become insurgents who use terror 
or asymmetric tactics.   
This chapter will examine the Palestinian struggle against the Israelis, and, more 
specifically, the two Intifadas.  The chapter analyzes the 1967 and 1973 wars to show 
how and why the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were successful in defeating the opposing 
militaries in two conventional wars.  It will also show the contrast when Israel’s 
formidable military mobilized to respond to Palestinian rioting, attacks, and eventually 
use of terror tactics.  Faced with that unconventional form of warfare, the IDF became 
much less decisive and the conflict became increasingly protracted.  One of the reasons 
for that lies in the general tendency of militaries to adhere to theoretical concepts such as 
Clausewitz’s theory of a center of gravity.  Recall from the introduction that Clausewitz 
defined the COG as the enemy’s “hub of all power and movement, on which everything 
depends.”  I am arguing here that it is difficult for military strategists to devise strategies 
to defeat non-state forces because the concept of a COG, as traditionally defined, is not 
applicable to the typical tactics used by the inferior force in asymmetrical warfare.  
The method used in this thesis to organize and support the argument is as follows: 
discuss the success of the Israeli military against the Arab state-instituted militaries 
during the 1967 and 1973 wars; give an overview of the First Intifada (1987–93); analyze 




the First Intifada and the start of the Second Intifada (September 2000); give an overview 
of the Second Intifada and describe Israel’s response; and, finally, describe the results of 
the thesis’s analyses. 
B. ISRAELI MILITARY SUCCESSES AGAINST STATE SPONSORED 
FORCES, AND THE BEGINNING OF DIFFICULTIES AGAINST 
UNCONVENTIONAL FORCES 
1. The 1967 Six Day War 
This war is known as the Six Day War because Israel defeated the combined 
military forces of Jordan, Syria, and Egypt in six days.  It began with Israel’s strategic 
decision to launch a preemptive attack against the Egyptian Air Force that was critical in 
its eventual victory, because the Egyptians had the most modern aircraft in the Arab 
Middle East.  Israel chose to strike first because of its fear of Egypt’s thirty TU-16 
Badger bombers, which were capable of inflicting heavy damage on the Israeli military 
and civilian centers.  To the Israelis, the Egyptian Air Force became a Clausewitzian 
center of gravity because of its potential impact on the outcome of the war. 
The Egyptian forces in the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula consisted of “7 
divisions, four armored, two infantry, and one mechanized infantry. Overall, Egypt had 
around 100,000 troops and 900–950 tanks in the Sinai, backed by 1,100 APCs and 1,000 
artillery pieces.”29  Israel, with no strategic depth and facing seven divisions, mobilized 
its forces.  Several tactical elements made a swift Israeli advance possible: first, the 
complete air superiority the Israeli Air Force had achieved over its Egyptian counterpart; 
second, the determined implementation of an innovative battle plan; and third, the lack of 
coordination among the Egyptian troops.   
By June 10, 1967, Israel had completed its final offensive in the Golan Heights 
and a cease-fire was signed on the sixth day of the conflict, June 11.  Israel had seized the 
Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank of the Jordan River (including East 
Jerusalem), and the Golan Heights.  Thus, overall, Israel’s territory was increased 
tremendously, including about one million Arabs now placed under Israel’s direct control 
in the newly captured territories.  All made possible because Israel recognized that the 
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COG of the Arab forces was the Egyptian Air Force.  The preemptive strike on the COG 
by the Israelis enabled Israel to enjoy air superiority through out the duration of the war.  
2. The 1973 Arab–Israeli War 
During 1973, the Arab states, believing that their complaints against Israel were 
going unheeded (despite their threats to cut off oil supplies in an attempt to soften the 
pro-Israel stance of the United States), quietly prepared for war under the leadership of 
Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat.  On October 6, the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur, the 
Arab forces launched a two-pronged assault on Israel.  Egyptian forces struck eastward 
across the Suez Canal and pushed the Israelis back, while the Syrians advanced from the 
north.  Iraqi forces joined the war and Syria received some additional support from 
Jordan, Libya, and the smaller Arab states.   
The attacks caught Israel off guard, and it was several days before the country 
was fully mobilized.  Once mobilized, Israel forced the Syrian and Egyptian ground 
forces back and, in the last hours of the war, established a salient on the west bank of the 
Suez Canal.  These advances were achieved, however, at a high cost in soldiers and 
equipment.  Israel’s strategy had to be modified as their superior air forces could not be 
utilized due to pre-positioned surface to air missiles by Egypt and Syria.  As a result 
Israel attacked the ground forces-COG- of the Arab states.  The end result was a cease-
fire, and Israel had proved once again that its military was superior to its Arab neighbors. 
3. Israel in Lebanon 
Lebanon was engulfed in civil war between the Muslims and Christians, from 
1975 to the 1980s; to the jihadists, who were inspired by the Iranian Revolution, Lebanon 
was viewed as a vulnerable place to launch another Islamic revolution.  The instability in 
Lebanon which was caused by the civil war, created a vacuum that was filled by the 
Shiite Hezbollah movement.  Hezbollah formed as a result of the PLO and Muslim 
Brotherhood’s inability to Islamize the Palestinian cause in Lebanon.  Thus, throughout 
the 1980s “the Lebanese Hezbollah operated as an agent for growing radicalization of the 
Shiite community and as a tool for Iranian policy.”30 
                                                 
30 Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, London, New York: I.B. Taurus & Co. Ltd., 2004, 
127. 
26 
In June of 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon to remove the Palestinian threat to their 
northern border.  The Israeli forces were initially welcomed by the majority Shia 
Lebanese in the south for removing the heavy handed PLO forces, but soon the Lebanese 
were alienated.  Hezbollah soon began attacking the IDF forces, inflicting serious 
casualties.  The invasion was named; “Operation Peace in Galilee,” because of the PLO 
launched rocket attacks into Jewish towns in northern Galilee.31  The Israeli army was 
successful in driving out the PLO, but its occupation in southern Lebanon led to a 
counter-offensive by the militants in the Shiite community-Hezbollah.  Because the 
Shiites possessed an inferior force they used asymmetric tactics against the conventional 
Israeli army.  During the remainder of the 1980s Hezbollah staged attacks that brought in 
a multinational force which consisted of U.S., Italian and French troops; and then 
launched a series of ruthless attacks on the Israelis and the multinational forces that 
convinced the Western countries to withdraw their troops.32   
Hezbollah’s asymmetric tactics eroded Israeli public support for the Lebanese war 
and over time the Israelis were forced into a slow retreat to its borders.  In 2000, the 
Israelis were forced to unilaterally withdraw back to within its boundaries.  Hezbollah 
had proven that it was capable of inflicting military defeat on formidable conventional 
militaries, an accomplishment that inspired the intifada that began in 1987.  Hezbollah’s 
success against the vaunted IDF, where no conventional forces had succeeded, was seen 
by all in the region as validation of asymmetrical tactics against a superior conventional 
force.  The Palestinian resistance took notice and soon adopted Hezbollah’s tactics and 
religious fervor in their fight against the Israelis. 
C. THE FIRST INTIFADA 
The Palestinians have been subordinated and denied full citizenship rights 
throughout the twentieth century.  At the beginning of the century, they were the subjects 
of the Ottoman Turks.  With the end of World War I and until 1948, they were ruled 
under a British mandate.  Even after the mandate ended, the Palestinians had no national 
identity and the future was not promising.  By 1949, Palestinians who lived in the West 
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Bank had become subjects of the Kingdom of Jordan, and though offered Jordanian 
citizenship, they were treated as second-class citizens, experiencing both political and 
economic discrimination.  During that same period, Palestinians in the Gaza Strip lived 
under Egyptian military rule, which they continued to do so until the Israeli conquest of 
the Strip in 1967.  Since then, Israel has maintained a similar level of discrimination, and, 
in addition, has confiscated Palestinian land for IDF bases and Jewish settlements.   
Israel’s gain of territory through the 1949 Armistice and its control of the 
territories it has occupied since the 1967 War has had a significant impact on both the 
Palestinians and the neighboring Arab countries because of the number of Palestinian 
refugees that those events created.  As the Israeli settlement program in the West Bank 
and Gaza expanded, more Palestinians lost their land and homes.  Coupled with that, the 
growing Palestinian population and the repression and discrimination employed by the 
Israeli government steadily increased tensions until a violent backlash became inevitable. 
The Palestinians feared that as settlements grew in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip they 
would continue losing their lands, their national identity, and their remaining rights. The 
clearer it became that Israel’s primary intention was to colonize the last remaining 
Palestinian areas, the more the settlements became the target of the Palestinians’ 
frustration.  Finally, the only alternative was organized resistance.  
[A]lthough Israel had pushed the PLO as far as possible from its home, 
and killed many of its leading lights in an effort to stymie effective 
responses to its policies, the weight of dispossession and eviction 
ultimately produced a grassroots reaction to the occupation.33 
During Israel’s continuing occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the 
Israeli government has prevented the Palestinians from forming a unified political 
authority that could effectively unite the people to collectively resist the rule of the Israeli 
occupation.  To achieve this policy, the denial of any rival power, the Israeli state has 
used a three-pronged approach:  
The first major component has been the repression and suppression of any 
organizational vehicle that threatened to succeed in uniting the Palestinian 
people in opposition to the occupation. The second element has been the 
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age-old device of divide and rule: trying to foment divisions within and 
between resistance movements. An integral part of this second strategy, 
and the third element in their overall policy, has been the attempt to 
promote alternative organizational structures with an accommodating and 
compliant leadership, in order to undermine the claims to legitimacy of 
those organizations and leaders that the Israelis have deemed to be most 
threatening to their interests.34 
This approach by Israel was aided by the geographic and other divisions that exist within 
the social structure of the Palestinians: social classes, villages, towns, regions, and 
different family and clan networks. 
On December 9, 1987, after four Gazans were killed in a collision with an Israeli 
vehicle, protests erupted in the Jabalia refugee camp in the Gaza Strip.  According to the 
Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, during the protest a Palestinian youth was 
shot and killed.35  Eventually, the protest spread throughout the occupied territories and 
casualties mounted.  It is important to note, however, that in the beginning the Palestinian 
protest was considered non-lethal; it consisted mainly of peaceful demonstrations and 
rock throwing.  But as the rebellion, or “intifada,” continued, more violent actions by the 
Palestinians increased; and the violent counter-tactics used by the IDF only heightened 
their anger and resentment. 
The movement at the beginning of the Intifada was decentralized, and was led by 
local activists fueled by local complaints.  In most areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
it enjoyed popular participation and a wide repertoire of civil disobedience.  There were 
cases of local committees challenging Israel’s civil administration by such things as 
opening an underground school system after the Israelis closed the schools; a boycott of 
Israeli products; people destroying their military identity cards; and a tax rebellion.36 
Because the resistance had participation on various fronts, it was able to sustain itself. 
And unlike military-on-military engagements, the Israeli army had no centralized  
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authority to attack.  The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) claimed to be the 
authority behind the Intifada, and by 1989 they sought to control and centralize the 
movement. 
Given all these factors and the mass scale of the uprising, it is unlikely that it was 
initiated by any one person or organization.  However, realizing the magnitude of the 
opportunity to gain power and influence, the PLO was quick to take the reins, providing 
incitement to the resistance and enhancing their presence in the occupied territories.  But 
the PLO was not the only group that recognized the opportunity.  It had to compete in its 
activities with radical Islamic organizations such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad.  What is significant about this is that the uprising was not led predominantly by 
any one of those groups.  It was led by community councils consisting of ordinary 
Palestinians creating autonomous structures and networks in the midst of the violent 
Israeli occupation.  The councils focused on creating independent, often underground 
infrastructures such as autonomous schools, medical care and food aid facilities, and 
other basic institutions. 
D. ISRAEL’S RESPONSE TO THE FIRST INTIFADA 
Ultimately, Israel was successful in containing the uprising.  The Palestinian 
force, generally unarmed demonstrators and rock throwers, was drastically inferior to the 
well-equipped and trained Israeli military force.  Nonetheless, the Intifada highlighted 
numerous operative and tactical problems in the Israeli military’s response, as well as the 
general problem of Israel’s prolonged occupation of the Palestinian territories.  These 
problems were noticed and widely criticized, both in international forums—in particular, 
when humanitarian questions were at stake—and in Israeli public opinion, in which the 
Intifada had caused a split. 
The military violence was the source of criticism internationally and locally.  The 
IDF responded to the Palestinian mass protest by shooting demonstrators with live 
ammunition, by beating the protesters with clubs and rifle butts, by tear gas attacks and 
mass arrests, by deportation, and by school and university closures. The objective was to 




leaders who orchestrated the demonstrators as the COG.  The Jerusalem Media and 
Communication Centre (JMCC) noted specific occurrences of each response with the 
following results.  
1. Shootings  
At first, the Israeli military responded to the conflict by inflicting direct physical 
punishment on the Palestinians.  The use of live ammunition, tear gas, and rubber bullets 
to disperse street demonstrators was common.  A large number of Palestinians fell victim 
to the Israeli military forces, even though they were not directly involved in street 
confrontations or other forms of public protest: some casualties were bystanders; others 
became casualties while inside their homes.  It was also reported by the international 
press that undercover Israeli hit squads were assassinating Palestinian activists. 
2. Beatings  
According to a Jerusalem Post report, Defence Minister Rabin stated that: “The 
first priority of the security forces is to prevent violent demonstrations with force, power, 
and blows. . . . We will make it clear who is running the territories.”37  During the course 
of two days following the minister’s statement, more than a hundred Palestinians 
received treatment from hospitals because of broken bones and fractured skulls.  On 
January 25, 1988, the Shifa hospital treated two hundred Palestinians for similar 
injuries.38 
3. Teargassing  
According to Amnesty International, tear gas was used “in such a way as to 
constitute a punitive measure, to harass and intimidate Palestinian residents in the 
occupied territories.”39  There were reports of instances where tear gas was fired into 
homes, mosques, hospitals, and schools.  As a result of that excessive use, 
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4. Mass Arrests  
This tactic was used immediately: between December 9 and January 6, 1988, 
1,978 Palestinians were arrested, according to Defense Minister Rabin.  As the Intifada 
wore on, the violence and number of threats increased, primarily because, in protest 
cycles, as mobilization begins to decline, violence fills the void.  Arrests by the Israeli 
forces increased as well. Al-Haq, a Palestinian human rights organization, reported that 
by May 1, 1988, upwards of 17,000 Palestinians had been imprisoned.40   
5. Deportation   
Israel was determined to deport anyone the government perceived as a 
“ringleader” of the uprising.  On January 3, 1988, the Israelis charged nine Palestinians 
with “incitement” and served them with expulsion orders.  During the first two years of 
the Intifada, fifty-eight Palestinians were reported to have been deported.41 
6. School and University Closures  
Palestinian schools were ordered closed less than fourteen days after the Intifada 
began.  During the first year, all West Bank and Gaza Strip schools and vocational 
centers were closed for approximately eight months.  The result of the closures was the 
denial of 310,000 Palestinians’ right to an education.  The implementation of curfews 
was also instrumental in the disruption of school operations.  Institutions of higher 
learning also fell victim to closure orders, because Israeli administration officials 
perceived that campuses provided a place for people to gather and that unrest would 
inevitably occur. 
The tactics used by Israeli forces were scrutinized because the “enemy” was often 
ordinary Palestinians who were mobilizing to gain the right and freedom of self-
determination.  There was no doubt that the IDF would eventually contain the security 
situation, but the uprising, which started out decentralized, made it difficult for the IDF to 
pinpoint a Center of Gravity (COG).  The Intifada continued, and even after the PLO and  
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other organizations achieved some control, it was difficult to end.  Indeed, the first 
Intifada did not come to an end until 1993, as a result of the Oslo Agreement, an external 
political settlement. 
E. OUTCOMES 
According to the B’Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights, by 
the time the Oslo Agreement was signed in 1993, 1,162 Palestinians, 241 of them 
children, and 160 Israelis, 5 of them children, had died in the violence.42  In the first 
thirteen months of the first Intifada, 332 Palestinians and 12 Israelis were killed.43  The 
initial high fatality rates suffered by the Palestinians were primarily due to the Israel 
military’s lack of experience in non-lethal pacification and crowd control tactics.  When 
the soldiers faced demonstrators, they usually had no riot-control rubber munitions and 
would shoot unarmed demonstrators with live rounds.  The fatality rate also included 
Palestinians who were killed by their own side as collaborators. 
The Intifada was never a military endeavor in either a conventional or a guerrilla 
sense.  The PLO, which had only limited control of the situation, never expected the 
uprising to make any direct gains against the Israeli state, as it was a grassroots mass 
movement and not orchestrated.  The goals of the Intifada were to shed the occupation 
and achieve self-determination; goals that have still not been achieved.  However, the 
Intifada did produce a number of results that the Palestinians could consider positive: 
a. By engaging the Israelis directly, rather than relying on the authority or 
assistance of neighboring Arab states, the Palestinians were able to identity themselves 
globally as a separate people worthy of self-determination.  
b. The extreme Israeli countermeasures, especially at the beginning of the 
Intifada, resulted in international attention to the plight of the Palestinians.  The media 
reporting of Palestinian children being shot and killed for throwing rocks at Israeli 
soldiers aroused the concern of numerous international spectators.  More important, most 
of the U.S. media outlets openly criticized Israel in a way that previously had never been 
                                                 
42 B’Tselem, “Two-thirds of Palestinians Killed in the West Bank This Year Did Not Participate in the 
Fighting,” December 8, 2004 (Internet, accessed March 2005). 
43 Ibid. 
33 
done.  The conflict succeeded in putting the Palestinian question back on the international 
agenda, particularly in the UN, but also for Europe and the United States as well as the 
Arab states.  As a result, Europe increased its economic contributions to the Palestinian 
Authority, and the United States began to set conditions on its aid to Israel.  
c. The movement also dealt a heavy economic blow to Israel.  The Israeli Trade 
and Industry Minister, Ariel Sharon, stated that “between 1987 and 1988, sales of Israeli 
products to the occupied territories fell by the following percentages: agriculture 
products, 60 percent; textiles, 18 percent; clothes, 8 percent; nonmetallic minerals, 10 
percent; rubber/plastics, 11 percent; and quarry stone, 8 percent.”44  The impact on the 
tourist industry was negative as well.  
d. And although the Oslo negotiations failed to fulfill their potential, it is 
important to note that prior to the First Intifada, it was doubtful whether there would ever 
be a Palestinian state.  After the Oslo Accords, an independent Palestine of some sort, at 
some time in the future, seemed a relative possibility. 
e. The Palestinians were able to sustain resistance against the formidable Israeli 
military for nearly six years, whereas most Arab militaries had been defeated handily by 
the same forces.  
F. THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND INTIFADAS 
Despite the Oslo Agreement, signed by the PLO and Israeli governments, the 
Palestinians continued to experience oppression.  The Agreement’s signing had been 
contingent on the Palestinians’ trust that Israel would allow them to have better lives. 
Since that time, however, Palestinian spokespersons and many others have repeatedly 
pointed out that that trust continues to be betrayed by the cruel deeds and harsh decrees of 
the Israeli military,45 including: the permit system; detention and torture; land 
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1. The Permit System 
The permit system was not a tool designed only to restrict the movement of the 
Palestinians.  Because the system is key in the prevention of groups unifying to oppose 
occupation, the system actually, in effect, undermines Palestinian nationalism.  Also, by 
their use of the permit system, the Israeli military authorities have effectively divided the 
Palestinians into three groups:  
Jerusalemite Palestinians are the luckiest of all: their identification card 
enables them to move in and out of Jerusalem and to visit the various 
Palestinian areas. West Bank Palestinians are not so fortunate; they have 
relative freedom to move between the big towns, but they cannot enter 
Jerusalem or Israel without a separate permit. Given the particular 
emotional, religious, and commercial significance of the capital, this has 
seriously affected many Palestinians who live just a few miles away from 
the Holy City. . . . Palestinians from Gaza, meanwhile have suffered most 
of all. Requiring documentation both to visit the West Bank and to reside 
there, Gazans have found the permit system to be an effective jail 
sentence.46 
The Oslo Agreement guaranteed the Palestinians that the territorial integrity of the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip would be maintained, but the permit system undermines that by 
separating friends and family in the two areas.   
2. Detention and Torture 
When Israel invaded the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, martial law was 
ordered as a means to police the Palestinians.  Even after the Oslo process, those orders 
remained in place—solely because it afforded the military the ability to arrest, detain, and 
torture suspects without scrutiny by the Palestinian Authority.  For example, “after the 
bus bombs of February and March 1996, hundreds of students from Bir Zeit University 
near Jerusalem were arrested in an enormous dawn raid on their dormitories.”47 The 
significance of that raid is that, since Bir Zeit was in Area B (an area where Israel has full 
security control), there was nothing that the students, the Palestinian Authority, or the 
Palestinian police could do. 
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The terror tactics adopted by Palestinians at the end of the First Intifada applied 
pressure on the Israeli government to change its policies.  Instead, Palestinians were 
frequently arrested on suspicion of belonging to terror groups and then tortured in the 
hope that they would yield the names of their colleagues.  The possibility, or even 
probability, that the Palestinian being tortured might be innocent did not deter the 
torturers.48   
3. Land Confiscation 
From the beginning of its occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Israel 
sought to legitimize its claim to the territory.  The Israeli leaders took components of 
laws that had been created by past occupiers and combined them into procedures that 
would suit Israeli interests.  The Oslo Agreement did nothing to counter those laws and 
assure the security of Palestinian land.  Thus, Israel has been able to circumvent and 
manipulate the system to continually confiscate land from the Palestinians.  One 
illustration of this practice was the state’s establishment of a process in law whereby 
Palestinian land can be legally taken away from its owners for the purpose of building 
roads or settlements for Israelis only.49  The Oslo Agreements proved unable to prevent 
land confiscation.  And the resulting forced homelessness and despair are additional 
grounds for the incitement of violence and resistance.  
4. House Demolition 
The bulldozer has been just as essential and effective for the Israeli government as 
the live rounds that the Israeli military fired at demonstrators armed with rocks.  Israel 
reserves the right to demolish existing homes when it lays claim to the property or when 
the owners are suspected or accused of criminal behavior, especially as suicide bombers.  
B’Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, 
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percent in the Gaza Strip, belonged to people suspected of being connected with a 
killing.50  Others had their homes destroyed because of a suspicion of incitement, 
resisting arrest, or throwing a petrol bomb.”51 
5. Environmental and Economic Exploitation 
While it is a fact that the West Bank and Gaza Strip has historical and emotional 
significance for both Jews and Arabs, it is also true that they have critical resources such 
as water and land.  As the number of Jewish immigrants increases, so does the demand 
for water.  Given the overwhelming strength of the Israeli forces and their apparent 
ability to impose the government’s will, in 1967, all existing wells were placed under 
Israeli supervision, and no wells could be dug without express Israeli permission.52  From 
an economic perspective, professionals found the settlements in the West Bank appealing 
because of their proximity to Jerusalem.  Thus the government sold to them and invested 
in the infrastructure in those areas. 
As a result of the quite different circumstances that the Palestinians had to live 
with, tensions peaked and rebellion became inevitable.  The peace process did not deliver 
on the merits of its content: the Oslo Agreement was unsuccessful. 
G. THE SECOND INTIFADA AND THE ISRAELI RESPONSE 
The Second Intifada began in September 2000, and, unlike the First Intifada, it 
started with violent confrontations and a large number of casualties.  Another key 
difference was that the Palestinian Authority had sovereign areas and security forces. 
And though those security forces were inferior in numbers, training, and weapons, the 
Israelis could and did justify excessive force under a “conduct of war” auspice.  The level 
of the Palestinian violence, which is still being carried out somewhat today, made it easy 
for Israel to justify its actions.  The Palestinians seem to have experienced what Robert 
Gurr refers to as “radicalization,” a process in which the group has been mobilized in  
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pursuit of a social or political objective but has failed to make enough progress toward 
the objective to satisfy all activists.53  As Gurr points out, when this process occurs, 
participants either become discouraged or intensify their efforts.   
The following bullets are the findings from a 2002 report that the UN Secretary-
General prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution ES-10/10 concerning the 
violent events that took place at the Jenin Camp highlight the level of violence that has 
been used throughout this Intifada.  
• Since the outbreak of crisis in September 2000, the origins of which have 
been comprehensively set out in the report of the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-
Finding Committee headed by former Senator George Mitchell, there has 
been sustained violence between the parties, fluctuating in intensity, 
causing by 7 May 2002 the deaths of 441 Israelis and 1,539 Palestinians.  
By the beginning of 2002, the parties were already locked in an 
accelerating cycle of violent attacks.  This cycle of violence further 
increased in intensity through the early months of this year. The violence 
reached a high point in the months of March and April, which saw suicide 
bomb attacks against Israelis by Palestinian groups increase in frequency, 
and two waves of incursions by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) into 
Palestinian towns and villages in the West Bank, including areas under the 
administrative and security responsibility of the Palestinian Authority. 
• On 12 March 2002, after a series of terrorist attacks carried out by 
Palestinians earlier in that month, and as the first wave of IDF incursions 
into the West Bank was coming to a close, I told the Security Council in a 
briefing that I believed that Israeli-Palestinian tensions were at boiling 
point and that the situation was the worst in 10 years. I called on 
Palestinians to stop all acts of terrorism and all suicide bombings, stating 
that such attacks were morally repugnant and caused harm to their cause. I 
called on Israelis to stop the bombing of civilian areas, the extrajudicial 
killings, the demolitions, and the daily humiliation of ordinary 
Palestinians. I asserted that such actions gravely eroded Israel's 
international standing and fuelled the fires of hatred, despair, and 
extremism among Palestinians. Finally, I urged the political leaders of 
both peoples—Prime Minister Sharon and Chairman Arafat—to lead their 
peoples away from disaster. 
• Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israelis continued, followed by Israeli 
military incursions into Palestinian areas. On 4 April, one week into the 
second wave of incursions in the West Bank—the Israeli Defense Forces’ 
Operation Defensive Shield—  I again briefed the Security Council and 
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called on all members of the international community to consider urgently 
how best to intercede with the parties to persuade them to draw back from 
their present course. I told the Council that self-defense was not a blank 
check, and that responding to terrorism did not in any way free Israel from 
its obligations under international law, nor did it justify creating a human 
rights and humanitarian crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. 
Equally, the Palestinian Authority seemed to believe that failing to act 
against terrorism, and inducing turmoil, chaos, and instability, would 
cause the Government and people of Israel to do which I believed they 
would not. I called on the Government of Israel to comply with Security 
Council resolution 1402 (2002) and withdraw its forces from the 
Palestinian territory it had occupied during Operation Defensive Shield. I 
urged Chairman Arafat to exercise political leadership and set the course 
for the future of his people.54 
The nature of this conflict clearly illustrates how resistance movements, no matter 
how centralized, are increasingly tough to dismantle with the use of military force.  Israel 
possesses the most technological advanced military in the region, but the Intifada 
continues, and their control of the occupied territories remains tenuous.   
H. CONCLUSION 
Following its victories against Arab armies in 1956, 1967, and 1973, the Israeli 
Defense Forces were frustrated: there was simply no Clausewitzian Center of Gravity to 
be found in unconventional forces like Hezbollah in Lebanon and the PLO, and Islamic 
Jihad in the occupied territories and Israel.  The Intifadas represented a mass mobilization 
of resistance for the years and years of oppression experienced by the Palestinians due to 
occupation.  The movements clearly presented problems for Israel as violence escalated 
from the beginning of 1987 and continue to some extent presently.  But Israel faced two 
very different enemies in the Arab militaries of Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and other Middle 
Eastern countries during the 1967 and 1973 Wars and in the Palestinians during the 
Intifadas.  Nonetheless, the tactics were similar in that in the Intifadas, Israel directed its 
military force at the movement’s leadership which it considered the source of the unrest.  
Those leaders were thought to be critical to the success of military operations.  The 
strategic decision to target the leaders followed the concept of COG that was presented 
by Clausewitz as well as the doctrine that the United States employs today. 
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On the other hand, Israel’s use of the COG concept during the 1967 and 1973 
Wars proved to be correct as Israel decisively won the Six Day War and pushed opposing 
forces back prior to the cease-fire during the 1973 War.  Clausewitz’s COG is applicable 
when the participants in a conflict are state militaries employing conventional war tactics 
under the rules and laws established by the international community.  But the COG 
concept as currently applied is not applicable when the use of a state’s military is 
deployed to combat hostile non-state forces that use asymmetric tactics.  This is the 
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IV. THE UNITED STATES VERSUS RADICAL ISLAMIST 
TERRORISTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
With the end of the Cold War, the United States became the sole superpower and 
achieved a status of hegemony.  This role has caused the U.S. to spread its influence 
throughout the world, but most importantly throughout the Middle East.  
But as the U.S. economy grew to its present status, so did its dependence on oil 
resources.  And the United States’ economic and military presence in the Middle East 
outraged many Muslims, some of whom responded with acts of terror against U.S. 
military personnel and citizens.  Although the strength of the U.S. military is unmatched 
in the world, the asymmetric tactics used by non-state actors have proven more difficult 
to combat.  Since September 11, 2001, the strategies used by the United States to fight 
the Global War on Terror—which primarily consists of Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom—are based on strategies military officers have 
been taught to use to conduct war against another state military.  Those strategies include 
as a central element the concept of a fighting force’s “Center of Gravity” (COG).   
The reason COG, as traditionally defined, is not applicable for this type of 
asymmetric environment is because non-state actors do not have a critical central 
component, or “hub,” that an opposing conventional military—such as the U.S. 
military—can target.  The enemy that is perpetrating acts of terror against Americans is 
largely faceless and operates in small groups, or cells, that are usually independent of one 
another.  Since September 11th, the United States has sought to find and capture or kill 
leaders of the various terrorist networks.  Such a strategy is consistent with the concept of 
COG, and some operations have, to a certain degree, been successful.  Nonetheless, acts 
of violence against the United States and its allies continue.  
This chapter will examine the historical events that led to U.S. involvement in the 
Middle East and the so-called Jihadists, who are launching acts of terror against 
Americans.  The chapter will also analyze the recent conflicts that the U.S. is engaged in  
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the Middle East under the umbrella of the global war on terror.  The purpose of this 
review is to illustrate some of the problems, such as the protracted nature of conflicts that 
a traditional application of the concept of COG against non-state actors presents.  
B. BACKGROUND 
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has enjoyed a military advantage 
over the armies of all other countries throughout the world.  The position of “world 
superpower” comes with unique responsibilities, including global policing, that require 
enormous amounts of resources.  The United States also has the largest economy in the 
world, which affords it the resources to fulfill its hegemonic responsibilities.  As the 
world’s largest industrial nation, the United States must also protect the interests that 
allow its market-based economy to thrive.  It is within that context that threats such as 
global terrorism present a challenge to the United States’ national security. 
As the largest importer of crude oil, the United States must now compete with 
growing economies such as China and India.  According to the Energy Information 
Administration/International Energy Outlook 2003 (EIA/IEO), the world demand for 
crude oil will increase from 78 million barrels per day (bpd) to 119 million bpd by 
2025.55  And because the Middle East is the largest exporter of oil, stability in the region 
is a priority for the United States.  
The United States first realized its vulnerability with respect to Persian Gulf oil 
resources during the Arab Oil Boycott in 1973.  Following the boycott, in 1979, the Shah 
of Iran was overthrown by radical Islamist revolutionaries; and later that year, on 
Christmas day, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.  In light of these events, Washington 
was forced to take a more active role in the region if its interests were to be protected.   
Prior to 1979 the United States had had only a small military presence in the 
Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.  But after 1979, in an effort to project force into the 
region and establish bases to operate from, the United States ramped up its military 
capability there.  The U.S. footprint that was created in Saudi Arabia during the first Gulf  
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War during 1990–91 caused both regional and international dissent, as many Muslims 
interpret the Koran as banning all infidels from the land that is home to Islam’s Two Holy 
Mosques. 
Anti-Americanism, which was connected to the new Iranian regime, soon spread 
to Lebanon, Libya, and Syria.  The terrorist attacks on the U.S. Embassy and the Marine 
barracks in Lebanon in 1983 and the Libyan attack on Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988 were 
three of the most violent foreign terrorist attacks against Americans prior to September 
11, 2001. 
1. The Iranian Revolution 1979 
The Iranian Revolution made everyone within and outside the Muslim world 
suddenly aware of militant Islamism.  Prior to the revolution, Iran had enjoyed prosperity, 
largely due to the high price of oil: it was the world’s second largest exporter after Saudi 
Arabia.56  Iran’s army was also among the largest in the world and was the regional 
power used to police the Gulf and protect the Indian Ocean from Soviet expansion.  The 
United States provided the Shah, its greatest ally in the Gulf, with sophisticated weaponry 
to protect the U.S. interest in oil and to aid Iran’s containment of communism.  One 
consequence of this close relationship was the large U.S. presence required to maintain 
the sophisticated weaponry and oil-related technology. 
Ayatollah Khomeini deeply resented the U.S. influence and the presence of U.S. 
personnel on Iranian soil.  And, like many other Iranians, he believed that the United 
States was taking the place of the British as a dominant force in Iran.  His public defiance 
and accusations against the Shah resulted in his fifteen-year exile, “during which the 
ayatollah developed his political theology for the future Islamic Republic of Iran and 
from which he returned victorious in February 1979, carried aloft by the triumphant 
revolution.”57    
But why did the revolution occur?  The primary factor was the political dissent 
among the urban poor, the middle class, and student radicals, the source of which was the 
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imperial system.  The regime promoted policies that modernized the country and 
encouraged the growth of an educated middle class, but did not allow that class political 
inclusion.  This and the absence of democratic principles such as freedom of speech and 
of the press fostered an environment that allowed radical sentiment to grow. 
The radicalism began with the students and had two ideological sources: Marxism 
and an Islamic movement known as “socialist Shiism.”  The Marxist group grew among 
the intellects, but was not popular among the ordinary people because of its foreign 
nature.  In the early 1970s, the Marxist-Leninist People’s Fedayeen, a group that tried to 
impose the ideology of Mao on the Iranians, had provoked an uprising, but was 
suppressed by the monarch. 
The Shah continued to promote policies of modernization, which caused unrest 
among the devout middle class—who were associated with the market place—and the 
numerous immigrants in the countryside who migrated to the cities. The immigrants 
moved into the cities in the hope of obtaining prosperity, but ended up settling into the 
packed slums of Tehran.58  Many people in the middle class prospered, but the gap 
between it and the commercial elites widened due to the elites’ access to businesses 
dealing with the military and oil.  Among the two social classes, the unrest continued to 
grow, as poor living conditions and economic uncertainty persisted. 
The regime continued to alienate the devout middle class and the migrants from 
the countryside, who eventually became a part of the urban working class.  As a result, 
the two classes assumed a general point of view that was filtered through Shiism.  The 
mosque became the source of order and provided social services that the regime was 
unable or unwilling to provide.  
The rift between the secular, modernist ideology and religious networks 
increased.  While the imperial power sought to marginalize the clergy, support for Shiism 
was growing at a rapid pace.  And thus, the most significant error that the Shah made was 
not establishing reliable representation in the hierarchical Shiite clergy. 
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In 1975, oil prices declined, creating more stress on the social classes as well as 
on the economy of the state.  The response by the Shah played a key role in his demise 
because of the reaction it incited.   
[T]he regime reacted by launching a large-scale anti-speculation campaign 
that hit the bazaar very hard; its best known merchants were thrown into 
prison and publicly humiliated. From that moment on, the merchants 
bitterly opposed the shah, and their guilds (asnaf) became conduits for the 
mobilization of men and means to bring him down.59 
The inevitability of regime change was drawing near as the civil society was on the verge 
of disruption. 
The next four years proved devastating for the Shah.  In 1976, the newly elected 
U.S. President, Jimmy Carter, targeted the brutal tactics of the regime in his global push 
for human rights.  The following year witnessed demonstrations by the liberals who 
opposed the regime, which met little repression from the regime.  In 1978, a government- 
supported newspaper article insulted Ayatollah Khomeini, who was in exile in Iraq, 
which caused many Muslims in Iran to rise in his defense.  The stage was set. Khomeini 
mobilized all the mosques, a clerical network supported by over 20,000 properties and 
buildings throughout Iran, where people gathered to talk and receive orders.60  In January 
of 1979, the Shah was driven out of Iran, and, at the beginning of February, the Party of 
the Islamic Revolution (PIR) was established. 
The overthrow of the Shah adversely impacted the United States and U.S. policies 
in the region, since the new regime was deeply anti-American.  Later in 1979, when the 
Shah entered the United States for cancer treatment, a PIR official led a group of 
Khomeini followers into the American Embassy and took fifty-two U.S. diplomats 
hostage.  In 1982, after President Reagan ordered Marines into Beirut following the 
Israeli invasion in June of that year, the Iranian-supported Hezbollah faction in Lebanon  
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responded to the new American military presence there by staging devastating car bomb 
attacks on the U.S. Marines barracks and twice on the U.S. embassy.61  Thus, the 
Americans witnessed for the first time the extreme violence of Middle East terrorism. 
2. Iraq–Iran War 
The Iraq–Iran War began in 1980 when Saddam Hussein invaded Iran.  There was 
speculation that the United States had supported the Iraqi invasion with hopes that 
Saddam would seize Khuzistan, which was rich with oil, and the new Iranian regime 
would collapse due to a lack of resources.  The Islamic Republic of Iran, a country with 
three times the population of Iraq, responded fanatically to fight the Iraqis.  The Reagan 
Administration decided that Saddam Hussein should not be allowed to be defeated by a 
radical Islamist, anti-American regime in Tehran.62  The United States, therefore, set out 
to assist Iraq, hence increasing its involvement in the Middle East and its support of a 
secular dictator against radical Islamists. 
Shortly after the war began, both sides endured heavy casualties and the war 
became a stalemate.  The United States sought options to prevent an Iraqi defeat and soon 
began assisting Saddam by intelligence sharing, loans, and pressure on countries that 
were supplying the Iranian military. 
Later, in 1986, as the war expanded to attacks against oil tankers in the Gulf, the 
Soviet Union offered to send its navy to the Persian Gulf to protect the Iraqi and Kuwaiti 
tankers.  Not surprisingly, the Reagan Administration deeply opposed the notion of 
Soviet ships patrolling the oil lanes and suggested that the Kuwaiti tankers, which were 
being attacked as well, be re-flagged as U.S. vessels.  The idea was that their registration 
and names be changed so that, as “American ships,” they would be subject to the 
protection of the U.S. Navy.63  Saddam and the Kuwaitis accepted the suggestion and the 
United States sent warships to the Persian Gulf to protect the re-flagged tankers. 
However, the United States was also providing assistance to Iran, in the form of 
weapons and intelligence, in an effort to gain a strategic opening.  The arrangement was 
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made public in November of 1986, part of what was termed “the Iran-Contra Affair.”  
Faced with the exposure of the scandal, President Reagan decided to tilt U.S. support to 
Saddam.  Playing both sides did little to enhance U.S. credibility in the region and fueled 
the anti-American sentiment that was already rapidly spreading throughout the region. 
3. The United States Strengthens its Military Cooperation with Israel 
Recognizing the threat of possible Soviet military involvement in the Middle East, 
the United States sought to firm up its military relations with Israel.  The threat posed by 
the Soviets to the eastern Mediterranean caused the Reagan Administration to seek 
stronger military ties with Israel primarily because of its strategic location and, possibly, 
because it was the only state in the Middle East that was democratic. In any event, the 
United States proposed “Strategic Cooperation” with Israel.64 
The U.S. relationship with Israel has grown steadily over the years since 1967, 
and has provided Arab radicals with propaganda to recruit terrorists in support of their 
anti-American cause.  Still today, the Arab radicals (and many Arabs, in general) protest 
the strong U.S.-Israeli relationship, largely because of the ongoing Arab–Israeli conflict.  
They accuse the United States of being biased toward Israel in its continued occupation 
of the Palestinian territories. 
4. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 
The Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, and the United States soon 
saw this as an opportunity to engage the Soviets in a proxy war that would financially 
strain the Soviet economy.  During that period, both superpowers sought strategies other 
than direct military engagement to weaken the opposing side.  The strategy implemented 
by the United States was to supply the Afghan and incoming Arab fighters with resources 
that would increase the Soviet costs for the war.  The Pakistani intelligence service was 
the conduit for much of the U.S. and other covert assistance.  Saudi Arabia was also a 
major contributor to the Afghan fighters.  In 1989, the Soviets decided to pull out of the 
country, which meant that a group of irregular fighters had successfully defeated a 
superpower.  According to the former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence, 
Richard Clarke, “Pakistani military intelligence funded by the U.S. and Saudi 
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governments and [charitable] organizations, had turned groups of nineteenth-century 
Afghan tribesmen and several thousand Arab volunteers into a force that had crippled the 
mighty Red Army.”65  Many of those volunteer Arab fighters would become the terrorist 
network known as al Qaeda. 
The United States made several critical mistakes in the 1980s that continue to 
plague America today.  First, by using the Pakistani intelligence service, the United 
States failed to establish any direct relations with the Afghans and the volunteers who 
were on the ground.  Second, the United States allowed the Saudis and other Arab states 
to recruit volunteers for the fight in Afghanistan without knowing what they would do 
after the Soviets pulled out.  The Saudis were the major player in recruiting and funding 
the Arab volunteers sent to Afghanistan.  Many of those recruits had ties with 
fundamentalist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood; others were trouble-makers in 
their own societies.  Third, after the Soviets were defeated, the United States quickly 
withdrew all its resources, thereby removing any leverage they might have had in regard 
to the future of the country, and leaving Afghanistan to its own fate.  Upon the 
withdrawal of the Soviets, the country erupted into years of civil war, and by the mid-
1990s, the Pakistan intelligence service used its influence to support the Taliban.  The 
Taliban, in turn, invited the Arab veterans of the war, al Qaeda, to fight for their cause 
against the Northern Alliance.  Fourth, the United States did little to assist Pakistan in 
dealing with the thousands of Afghan refugees who fled to Pakistan during the civil war. 
Pakistan, armed with nuclear weapons, was now politically unstable and the home for 
thousands of Islamic fanatics and many Arab misfits. 
5. The First Gulf War    
The first Gulf War began on January 16, 1991, and ended in March of that same 
year when a U.S.-led coalition handily defeated the Iraqi forces in a conventional military 
conflict.  The event that led to the war was Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990.  
When the U.S. received confirmation of Saddam’s invasion, President Bush’s 
Administration immediately realized that something had to be done.  There was grave 
concern that if Saddam was permitted to advance without consequence, nothing would 
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stop the Iraqi units from seizing the eastern oil fields of Saudi Arabia.  The implications 
of such actions would mean that Saddam would control most of world’s available oil, 
putting him in a position to dictate to the United States and the rest of the world. 
A decision was made to defend the Saudi oil fields, Operation Desert Shield, and 
to liberate Kuwait, Operation Desert Storm.  Prior to the launch of any operations, 
however, President Bush sought approval from the Saudis to allow U.S. forces into the 
country.  In a meeting held in Saudi Arabia, Dick Cheney, then secretary of defense, told 
the Saudi king that the United States believed that the kingdom might be in danger.  The 
Iraqis would possibly continue south from Kuwait and seize the Saudi oil fields.66  The 
king agreed to allow the U.S. forces into Saudi Arabia, even though some members of the 
royal family were deeply opposed.   
A number of Muslims protested the allowance of nonbelievers into the Kingdom 
of the Two Holy Mosques.  Among them was Osama Bin Laden.  In an effort to ease 
dissention, the Saudis and the United States set out to garner support from other Arab 
Nations, including Egypt, Bahrain, Syria, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and other 
Gulf countries.  At the onset of the war, the U.S.-led coalition numbered approximately 
thirty-four countries, which launched an operation that was an overwhelming success. 
At the conclusion of the war, the United States increased its cooperation with 
many Arab countries in the region.  That cooperation, which meant a greater U.S. 
military presence in the region, caused more radical Muslims to lash out at their 
governments which they viewed as corrupt and too close to the United States.  One end 
result was the spread of anti-Americanism and the call for jihad. 
C. AL QAEDA JIHAD 
To better understand the jihad that bin Laden calls for against America, we must 
first understand what the word “jihad” itself means. The Arabic word “jihad” refers to 
protecting the Islamic faith and is a call for a holy war against the enemies of Islam.  
Sheikh Atiyyah Saqr, a well-respected Muslim scholar associated with the Al-Azhar 
Mosque in Cairo, defines “jihad” this way: 
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The word means exerting effort to achieve a desired thing or prevent an 
undesired one. . . . Among the types of jihad are struggling against one’s 
desires, the accursed Satan, poverty, illiteracy, disease, and all evil forces 
in the world. . . . Jihad is also done to avert aggression on the home 
countries and on all that is held sacred, or in order to face those who try to 
hinder the march of the call of truth. In Islamic Shari’ah [law] jihad in the 
Cause of Allah means fighting in order to make the World of Allah most 
high and the means for doing so is taking up arms in addition to 
preparation, financing, and planning strategy.67 
This definition sheds light on why radical Muslims believed that the Afghan jihad against 
the Soviets was necessary.  It also shows why, given their perception and interpretation of 
U.S. actions, they believe that a jihad is also warranted against America. 
The conflict between fundamentalist Islam and the West, centers on Koranic 
scriptures that suggest that it is the duty of Muslims to protect their faith and to convince 
nonbelievers that Islam is the only way to enter the Kingdom of Allah.  It was this belief 
from the scriptures that has historically been the source of contention between Islam and 
the West.  It was the source of the conflict during the Crusades and the colonial era and 
continues to be the source of contention in present-day conflicts. 
In 1996, bin Laden issued a Declaration of War against America because 
American military forces were occupying the land of the Two Holy Places.  Bin Laden 
used the term “Crusaders” to refer to the United States and “Zionists” to refer to Israel.  
In the declaration, he called on Muslims to join the fight against the Crusaders, who were 
occupiers in Saudi Arabia, and the Zionists, who are occupying Palestine.  Nearly two 
years later, on February 23, 1998, Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri (leader of a 
jihadist group in Egypt), Abu-Yasir Rifa’I Ahmad Taha (Egyptian Islamic Group), 
Shaykh Mir Hamzah (secretary of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan), and Fazlur Rahman 
(leader of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh) declared a jihad against the U.S. 
government by issuing a fatwa—a legal opinion produced by a jurisconsult—against 
America and Israel, despite lacking the proper Islamic clerical credentials to do so. 
The difference between bin Laden’s jihad and the one issued in 1998 is that the 
latter used much stronger language.  
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The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies-civilians and military-is 
an duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is 
possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy 
mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out 
of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.68  
The CIA and FBI linked al Qaeda to the 1993 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, 
but bin Laden did not follow up on the fatwa until 1998, with the August 7 attacks on the 
U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya.  They claimed the lives of nearly 300 people, of 
which twelve were Americans, but most were African Muslims.  This attack was the 
jihadists’ first actual act of war against the United States.  
The Clinton Administration responded by launching an attack on al Qaeda 
training camps and the alleged location of a meeting of top al Qaeda officials.  The U.S. 
Navy launched a number of cruise missiles, but bin Laden escaped.  Al Qaeda launched 
additional terror attacks against the U.S., including the October 2000 attack on the USS 
COLE in Yemen.  And in 2001, bin Laden would launch the attacks that stunned 
Americans and the world. 
1. The September 11th Terrorist Attacks 
The level of cruelty and violence perpetrated against mankind in New York and 
Washington, D.C., on September 11, 2001, far exceeded any terrorist attack against the 
United States in the history of the country.  Al Qaeda successfully planted sleeper cells 
into the United States to develop the skills necessary to use U.S. aircraft as weapons.  The 
world was stunned, as many watched live coverage of the attacks on the Twin Towers 
and the Pentagon, killing thousands of people on U.S. soil.  Soon after those three attacks, 
a fourth hijacked plane crashed in Pennsylvania. 
Al Qaeda proved that its organization’s reach extended far beyond the boundaries 
of any country or region: as The 9/11 Commission Report pointed out, the jihad declared 
by the terrorist network was global.   
The 9/11 attack was an event of surprising disproportion. . . . It was 
carried out by a tiny group of people, not enough to man a full platoon.  
Measured on a governmental scale, the resources behind it were trivial.  
The group itself was dispatched by an organization based in one of the 
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poorest, most remote, and least industrialized countries on earth. . . . To 
us, Afghanistan seemed very far away. To members of al Qaeda, America 
seemed very close. In a sense, they were more globalized than we were.69         
The terrorists used the new tools of globalization, especially the rapid movement of 
people and knowledge across international borders, to launch the horrific attacks on 9/11.  
What the world asked was; How would the United States respond? 
D. GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM 
The Bush Administration began to draw up plans to invade Afghanistan with the 
hope of killing or capturing al Qaeda leaders in what would be called a Global War on 
terror (GWOT).  The initial response was to hunt down al Queda, and, preferably, bin 
Laden, in an effort to disrupt the terrorist network in Afghanistan. Many argued that the 
next step was to overthrow Saddam Hussein. 
1. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 
The attack on Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom, commenced on October 
7, 2001, with the objective of destroying terrorist training camps and infrastructure, 
capturing al Qaeda leadership, and achieving a cessation of terrorist activities in the 
country.  In this operation, the U.S. military’s strategy was consistent with the concept of 
center of gravity: the leadership and training camps were considered al Qaeda’s critical 
components and thus the key targets for the U.S.-led coalition.  The problem with this 
strategy, however, was that, while important, the training camps were not as important as 
the underlying fundamentalist Islamist ideology.  The U.S. government either did not 
know or ignored the fact that many radical Muslims around the world believed in the al 
Qaeda cause and were willing to die for it.  Because of what they perceived as Western 
injustice in the Islamic world, the people who launched the 9/11 and other attacks 
believed it was their duty as Muslims to wage war on the “infidels.”  Furthermore, a 
majority of the terrorists were (and are) faceless, coming from a vast worldwide pool of 
volunteers.  Hence, there is no way to capture or kill all of the potential future recruits or 
leaders who will fill the voids left by those captured or killed. 
The United States and the coalition have had some successes in capturing al 
Qaeda operatives, but terrorist attacks continue to persist against Western targets abroad, 
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including in Europe.  The actual al Qaeda network may have been fragmented, but that 
only presents new problems, as the coordination of the network is reduced and the targets 
diversified.  The fact is that we do not know how many supporters al Qaeda has, where 
they are, or when they might attack.  This makes it increasingly difficult to apply hard 
power, and a COG-influenced strategy, against the asymmetric tactics used by the 
jihadists. 
2. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 
Following its rapid success in Afghanistan, the Bush Administration, concerned 
about Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction and possible connections with 
terrorists, turned its attention to Iraq.  Determined to oust Saddam from power, it 
launched an attack, invading Iraq on March 19, 2003.  The United States and its coalition 
partners, in an amazing show of force, in what was called Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
demonstrated once again how successful the U.S. military can be when fighting an enemy 
in a conventional war.  Stealth fighters and Tomahawk missiles targeted numerous 
locations in Baghdad, followed by a precise strategic bombing campaign referred to as 
“Shock and Awe.”  Troops advanced into Iraq and swiftly stormed into Baghdad within 
three weeks of crossing the Kuwait–Iraq border.   
The intention of the shock and awe tactic was to affect, influence, and control the 
will and perception of the adversary, the Iraqi government and military.70  Technology 
made it easy to accomplish the mission.  It would not have mattered how prepared the 
Iraqi army was, there was no chance for it to be successful against the professional 
personnel and sophisticated weaponry of the U.S. military.  The strategy to attack the 
capital and the Iraqi army—the perceived centers of gravity—proved to be a success, as 
the major combat operations were completed in less than two months.  However, the 
insurgency that began shortly after the conclusion of combat operations continues three 
years later to launch indiscriminant terror attacks on both Americans and Iraqis.  
During the prewar planning phase, the United States failed to develop a 
comprehensive plan for the post-conflict environment.  The result of that neglect to 
properly plan is an insurgency that threatens the security of everyone in Iraq.  Weapons 
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and money are smuggled to the insurgents to disrupt reconstruction of Iraqi security 
forces, as well as to assist in the prevention of a government that would be influenced by 
the United States.  Due to the insurgency and the U.S. failure to properly plan for post-
conflict operations, the United States has lost the strategic initiative in Iraq.  The 
insurgents use asymmetric tactics and, because most of them are Iraqis, blend in with the 
overall population, making them extremely difficult to combat.  The conventional 
warfare lasted only two months; the insurgency has lasted more than three years. 
Currently, the United States faces a daunting task in trying to regain the strategic 
initiative—indeed it may be impossible at this point.71 
E. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. began ramping up its involvement in the Middle East in 1979, the same 
year that the Iranian Revolution occurred and the Soviet’s invaded Afghanistan.  The 
reason for the increase of American forces in the region was to protect the international 
oil flow and contain the spread of communism.  American forces in the region effectively 
carried out both missions; but in doing so, they also created anti-American sentiment 
among many Muslims communities and countries.  The result has been an increased 
number and lethality of terror attacks on Americans, as radical fundamentalist Muslims 
viewed, and continue to view, the U.S. as supporters of Israeli aggression and as illegal 
and forbidden occupiers of the most holy Islamic places in Saudi Arabia.  They also view 
Middle East governments that assist the United States as corrupt and launch terror attacks 
against those countries as well. 
The U.S. involvement in the region led to the Americans fighting the first Gulf 
War, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. While 
extremely successful in conventional warfare, due to the U.S. use of sophisticated 
weaponry and the skills of the men and women who operate it, the same cannot be said 
about how the U.S. military has fought the unconventional warfare of the insurgents and 
terrorist networks.  In Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States sought to locate the 
enemy’s center of gravity—the central component that was the source of its power—and 
to destroy it.  In an insurgency, however, that is not easy to do, primarily because the 
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enemy is not part of a massed state army and thus does not have a state capital or central 
state government.  It is the combination of these factors that make it difficult for the 
United States to define, seek out, and neutralize the centers of gravity of radical Islamist 
groups and to defeat the threat posed by this amorphous enemy. 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
57 
V. CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The cases analyzed in this research suggest that conventional militaries have a 
difficult time conducting operations against non-state actors that use asymmetric tactics, 
particularly terror tactics.  To understand how this phenomenon occurs, it is important to 
analyze the strategy of conventional forces. 
The tactics used by conventional forces fit perfectly with the military concept that 
Carl von Clausewitz called a “center of gravity” (COG), by which he meant a tangible, or 
at least a measurable, component of an enemy military’s will or ability to fight.  The 
reason this concept does not fit unconventional warfare lies in the meaning of COG as 
defined by Clausewitz: “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything 
depends.”72  The word “hub” means “a center of activity or a focal point,” which implies 
that the concept is valid only if the enemy has the unity or independence to act as a single 
body.73  Therefore, before applying the concept, military planners must consider whether 
the enemy at hand can act as a single entity.  If the findings suggest that it can, then the 
next step is to determine and confront what the element, or center of gravity, is that holds 
the enemy together as a single military entity. 
In the cases presented here, the conventional militaries targeted forces and their 
leaders, because the leaders were considered as the source of strength that held the enemy 
together.  But new leaders quickly filled any vacancies.  Thus, in those cases, the COG 
concept was not applicable: killing the leaders did not completely defeat the enemy.  And 
Clausewitz emphasized that militaries should look for centers of gravity only in wars 
designed to defeat the enemy completely. 
The strategy used by the French in Algeria and by the Israelis during the 
Palestinian Intifadas may not have been called a center-of-gravity strategy, but it fits all 
the parameters.  On the other hand, the concept of a COG appears in most military 
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doctrines that dictate strategies for U.S. military forces.  If the United States and others 
continue to implement this strategy in all conflicts, the future for conventional militaries 
against non-state enemies is discouraging. 
B. FUTURE CHALLENGES FOR THE U.S. MILITARY 
In the historical events discussed above, an outline that potential enemies could 
use to wage war against the United States has already been constructed.  While it is 
unlikely that any country can defeat the United States in a conventional war in the 
foreseeable future, it is entirely possible that an unconventional war would present an 
insurmountable threat in the form of a protracted conflict.  Operation Iraqi Freedom has 
exposed the United States’ inability to efficiently deal with the challenges of a low-
intensity conflict.  
The United States must properly identify the nature of a conflict before 
committing overwhelming force.  The Global War on Terror, or the Long War, as some 
now call it, is a good example of an inappropriate definition of the nature of a conflict.  
Yes, military forces are necessary for capturing or killing the terrorists.  But the reasons 
for the terrorists actions and the ideology that supports them must also be determined, 
acknowledged, and dealt with politically if the United States and its partners are to be 
successful in eliminating the majority of terrorist threats in the world. 
There has been some success in the so-called global war on terror.  For example, 
leaders of al Qaeda have been captured or killed and other countries have joined the war 
and have eliminated some terrorist havens and sponsorship.  Also, the U.S. has ramped 
up protection domestically by creating a Department of Homeland Defense.  However, 
terrorist attacks are still being carried out on Western targets abroad, and the enemy is 
still committed to fighting the United States.  The jihad is non-geographical in nature, and 
uses often the most disparate territories as short-term bases to train and carry out its 
operations.74  The non-geographical aspects cause considerable problems for the United 
States, because it extends the fight beyond its traditional war-making ability.  This is not  
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an enemy that can be defeated by solely military means.  It is a foe that must be dealt 
with by a wide variety of means: police work and forces, internal security apparatus, and 
various non-kinetic weapons like information operations. 
Today we are faced with the challenge of a global insurgency, which requires a 
better understanding of the enemy and a high level of strategic thinking.  The enemy 
understands and uses well the weapons of asymmetrical warfare, adapting its approach to 
deal with the superior conventional power of the U.S. military.  To be victorious, we 
must confront this dilemma and take our thinking to a new strategic level, so as to better 
understand the tools and strategic approaches required to achieve victory in this very 
different twenty-first-century environment.75  We must expand our thinking beyond the 
norms of traditional military action which were successful in winning state-on-state wars 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
To limit terrorist activities around the globe, the United States must use a mixture 
of military, foreign policy, and informational tools.  Military action should only be used 
to attack training grounds or on specific intelligence in cases where local security forces 
lack the sufficient motivation or capability.  A more thoughtful foreign policy is critical 
for obtaining international cooperation, changing anti-American attitudes in many regions 
of the world, severing the many means of support for jihadists, and alleviating the root 
causes of radicalism and terror.   
Success in the global war on terror will not depend on sophisticated military 
weapons.  The recent Quadrennial Defense Review includes many things that it claims 
will help the U.S. military conduct irregular warfare—that is, warfare against combatants 
who are not members of a nation-state’s traditional military.  However, the focus on 
strengthening U.S. military forces appears to confirm that the United States will continue 
to use the concept of military centers of gravity to develop its GWOT strategy.  In light of 
that, I make the following recommendations: 
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1.  First, determine the nature of the conflict; then determine whether there is a 
center of gravity to attack and whether the COG is able to be targeted. 
2.  Assess whether the enemy’s structure or network can act as a single unit.  
3.  Find the element that holds the enemy together.  If that element is its ideology, 
as is often currently the case, then assess what resources would provide the best results in 
attacking the ideology. 
4.  Redefine the military concept of a center or centers of gravity as the focal 
points that hold an enemy’s network or structure together. 
5.  Do not attempt to apply the conventional concept of a military center or 
centers of gravity to all wars or conflicts.  Being more selective in applying the concept 
of COG will ease some of the competition between political and military strategies and 
objectives. 
6.  Prior to determining an enemy’s COG, identify any gaps or connections that 
exist within the enemy’s structure.  There must be sufficient interconnectedness for the 
enemy to act with unity and thus for the concept to apply. 
7.  Reassess the designated centers of gravity and determine the need to attack 
them simultaneously and continuously. 
. 
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